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Venturing into the Minefield:
Turkish Liberal Historiography and
the Armenian Genocide
Bedross Der Matossian
Historiography normally refers to the act of writing history, the collective
writings of history and the history of such activities over time. I This chapter
addresses the collective writings of history by a group of scholars of "Turkish
origin," mainly deriving from a tradition ofleftist sentiments. What is particular
about this group of Turkish liberal historians is that they provide an alternative
historical interpretation2 of a specific historical event that is otherwise accepted
by the official Turkish history (resmi tarih) as an historical travesty.1
Historical events, which are conventionally regarded as the "building bricks
of history," are composed into a certain form that acts as a vehicle for the
creation and representation of historical knowledge and historical explanation.4 In other words, in the writing of history, events are placed into narrative
form. Historians argue that narrative is important because it is through it that
we understand the relationship between form and content, the word and the
world. 5 Furthermore, in this process of the creation and the representation of
historical knowledge and historical explanation it is narrative that transcends
the geographic, religious, national, ethnic, and cultural boundaries in conveying its messages. Hayden White argues on this point saying: "Far from being
a problem, then, narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of
general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into
telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assailable to
structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific ....
This suggests that far from being one code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing experience with meaning, narrative is a meta-code, a human
universal on the basis of which trans-cultural messages about the nature of a
369
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shared reality can be transmitted."6 The shared reality that is being transmitted
in this case through the medium of narrative is the historical event of 1915: the
Armenian Genocide. Though the historical event of 1915 is considered to be a
"shared reality" for both the "perpetrator group" 7 and the "victimized group,"
it does not mean that both groups have a common consensus or single definition
and interpretation of this shared reality. Whereas the "victimized group" for
decades has been fighting for international recognition of the historical event
itself through using the medium of narrative in its historical explanation, the
"perpetrator group" has been trying for decades to hinder the reality of the historical event through creating a narrative of its own by using the methodology
of negation, rationalization, relativization, and trivialization of the Armenian
Genocide. x Hence, the emergence of a new trend in Turkish historiography that
provides an alternative interpretation of the historical event of 1915 ought to
be considered as an important step toward a critical assessment of the state's
narrative on the historical event of 1915.
Though an alternative interpretation of the historical event of 1915 or a
critical assessment of Turkish state narrative on the event is considered to be
a sound approach, still one needs not forget that histories are always shaped
by both the perception of the historian and the way the historian would like
the events to be understood by others through the form of narrative. White
argues on this point saying "history can never provide the story, rather it is a
narrative designed by the historian as he/she organizes the contents in the form
of a narrative of what he/she believes the past was about."9 Furthermore, it is
the conglomerations of narratives of the historians that constitute an essential
component in the act of collective writing of history that eventually become
historiography. Thus, without narrative there can be no reconstruction of the
past and without historical imagination there can be no history and without
collective writing of histories there can be no historiography. For White "it is
the success of narrative in revealing the meaning, coherence, or significance
of events that attests to the legitimacy of its practice in historiography. And it
is the success of historiography in narrativizing sets of historical events that
attests to the 'realism' of narrative itself."lo
This analysis assesses the contents of the narrative of Turkish liberal historiography on the event of 1915, otherwise known by Turkish liberal scholars as
soykmm II (genocide), kzyzm 12 (massacre), katliam 13 (massacre), etnik temizlik14
(ethnic cleansing) and the widely used term by Turkish liberal scholars, kmm l5
(mass murder). One needs to take into consideration that each of these terminologies that define the historical event have different meanings ranging from
the magnitude to the premeditated nature of the event. This suggests that the
employment of different concepts by Turkish liberal historiography in defining
the historical event of 1915 demonstrates the variety of their treatment of the
historical event and thus shows their non-monolithic approach, contrary to what
appears in Turkish official history.
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However, in order for an account of past events to count as a proper history, it is not enough that it display all the features of narrativity. White argues
that "in addition the account must manifest a proper concern for the judicious
handling of evidence, and it must honor the chronological order of the original
occurrence of the events of which it treats as a baseline not to be transgrcssed
in the classification of any given event as either a cause or an effect. ... The
events must be not only registered within the chronological framework of their
original occurrence but narrated as well, that is to say, revealed as possessing a
structure, an order of meaning, that they do not possess as mere sequence."!('
Reform, economic advancement, revolt, immigration, nationalism. and
oppression constitute an essential chronological elements in the narrative of
Turkish liberal historiography on the event of 1915. Moreover. this series of
interconnected events constitutes the historical background and the historical
explanation in the interpretation of the Turkish liberal narrative ofthe deterioration of the Armeno-Turkish relationship and its culmination in the Armenian
Genocide. Hence, after discussing these interconnected events in the narrative
of Turkish liberal historiography on the deterioration of the Armeno-Turkish
relationship, I will dwell on the concept of causation and contextualization in
the historical explanation ofthe Armeno-Turkish relationship and then will move
to discuss the narrative of the event itself through the medium of premeditation-implementation and aftermath.

Reform
In his recent book, Taner Ak9am indicates that the real effects of important
social events can be felt only one hundred years after their occurrence. Based
on the theory of the German sociologist Norbert Elias,17 Ak9am indicates that
in order "to understand the Armenian Genocide it is essential to take perspective of at least a hundred years, back to the beginning of the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire."18 The continuous European pressure on the Ottoman Empire
in the nineteenth century played a decisive role in the internal administrative
and legal reforms ofthe Tanzimat period. This was evident in particular with the
position ofthe Christians and especially the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
Though the primary goal ofthese reforms was purely political, that is, to satisfy
the European powers, this does not mean that there was not an internal will to
improve the administration and the status ofthe non-Muslim elements living in
the Ottoman Empire. In addition, these reforms in particular in the provincial
system aimed at strengthening the control of the center over the periphery and
consequently a process of centralization began as an ultimate reaction to the
"dissolution" of the Ottoman Empire. For example, in 1864, a complete overhaul
of regulations on the organization of provincial government was initiated, a move
that aimed at bringing the periphery closer to the grip of the center.
However, the nineteenth-century reforms in the Ottoman Empire did not
have the same impact on the Muslims as they did on the non-Muslims. Fatma
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Muge Go<;ek argues that the effects of the reforms on the Ottoman Muslims
were largely negative. The Muslims interpreted the rights promised to the
minorities as a loss of their privileged position in the empire. 19 It is this
feeling of the loss of a privileged position and the "elevation" of the status
of the non-Muslims that led to the deterioration of interethnic relationships.
Furthermore, these reforms also had an impact on changing the dynamics
of power inside the Armenian millet in the Ottoman Empire and culminated
in the creation of the Armenian National Constitution and the crystallization of the Armenian identity. However, for Turkish liberal historiography
reform also meant international pressure as reform became a strong catalyst
that "opened the way for the imperialist powers to interfere in the Ottoman
Empire's internal affairs, and almost every national or religious group would
ultimately receive patronage and support from one of the Great Powers." 20
Subsequently, after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when the Armenian Question became internationalized, the issue of reform became a stronger catalyst
for European pressure. However, the deplorable condition of the periphery
led the Armenians constantly to demand reforms and appeal to the European
powers for intervention. Thus, the issue of reform and international intervention
were important factors that were to haunt the Armenian-Turkish relationship
until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Economic Advancement and Nationalism
The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838 and various trade agreements with
European powers in the nineteenth century led to a dramatic increase of European trade in the Ottoman Empire. Foreign trade in the Ottoman provinces
fell slowly under the monopoly of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, chiefly
of Greek and Armenian origin. For Turkish liberal historians economic
advancement had direct connection with the emergence of nationalism.
After demonstrating the economic advancement and integration of the
Armenians in the Ottoman society, Fikret Adamr poses the question, "Why
did the Armeno-Turkish relationship become catastrophic,?"21 One decisive
factor that he demonstrates is nationalism. 22 For Halil Berktay, Go<;ek, and
Adamr commerce had a direct impact on the emergence of Armenian nationalism. Berktay indicates that "trade, the money economy, and capitalism
first developed among the non-Turkish and non-Muslim population groups
of the empire. In this way these groups became more open to nationalist
movements and engaged in struggles against the empire in order to establish
their own nation states" [ulus devletlerini kurmak is::in].23 However, Go<;ek
indicates that "Turks and Muslim Arabs did not benefit from the changing
patterns of commerce as much as the Greeks and Armenians; in the case
of the Ottoman Turks, the commercial success of the Ottoman minorities
generated enmity and fostered Turkish nationalism."24 Her observation is important because it indicates that the economic advancement of the Armenians
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had a double impact. It not only fostered Armenian nationalism, but Turkish
reactionary nationalism as well. The various boycotts against the Austrians,
Greeks, and Armenians in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire enhanced
the radicalization of the Turkish nationalism, and as Gi1(,'ek indicates, "these
boycotts led the Unionists to conclude that only a national economy and a
Turkish bourgeoisie could withstand foreign intervention and domination.""
In addition, Go(,'ek considers some other factors that played an important role
as determinants of the structure of nationalisms that emerged in the nineteenthcentury Ottoman Empire. 26 These include war and reform movements, the new
visions of history that emerged in the intelligentsia of the ethnic groups living
in the Ottoman Empire and finally, their literature and education which gave
meaning to them. She continues on this point arguing: "The combination of
war, commerce, and reforms that transformed existing social relations thus
interacted with new visions painted by history, literature, and education and,
under the parameters set by the existing organizations of philanthropic and
secret societies and political parties, determined the patterns the nationalisms
within the Ottoman empire took." 27

Revolts and Immigration
Demographic changes in Anatolia as a result of immigration of Muslims
from the Balkans and the Caucasus and events taking place in the Balkans had
an important impact on the deterioration of the Armeno-Turkish relationship.
It is impossible to examine the historical background of the Armeno-Turkish
conflict without taking into consideration two important factors: revolts and
immigration. It is worthy to mention that in a span of twenty years. from 1862
to 1882, the immigration of the Muslim population from the Bal kans and Russia increased the Ottoman population by at least 40 percent." A good number
of these immigrants populated areas where Armenians were living thus creating population imbalance and consequentially creating tTiction among the
local populations and the immigrants. 29 The special status that the Armenian
merchants enjoyed under the protection of the European powers led these new
immigrants, persecuted by the tsarist regime in Russia, to be more antagonistic
toward the Armenians. It is worth mentioning that the situation in some parts of
the Anatolian provinces was already deteriorating. Frequent attacks by the Kurdish tribes on the Armenians, heavy taxation, friction with the newly immigrated
Muslims from the Caucasus and the Balkans, corruption in the administration,
and failure of Armenian efforts to solve these problems in a diplomatic way led
to the emergence of Armenian revolutionary groups. The Treaty of San Stefano
in March 1878 was followed in July by the Treaty of Berlin, considered by the
Armenians a disastrous diplomatic failure.
It seems that between 1878 and 1880 there was a major ideological shift
within the Armenian communities of Anatolia. It is only after 1880 that the
revolutionary movement emerged in the provinces. The Balkan insurrections
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on the other hand had an impact on the emergence ofthe Armenian revolutionary groupS.30 The nationalist uprising of the Balkan groups, beginning with
the Serbian revolt of 1804 and culminating belatedly in the Bulgarian revolt of
1875, had an impact on the Armenians living in Anatolia and shattered all kinds
of possible unity under the banner of OttomanismY Adamr indicates that the
beginning of these revolutionary activities in the eastern provinces was aimed
at resisting the encroachment ofthe Kurdish tribes. However, he indicates that
with the arrival of the Hnchak and the Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) underground groups the policy changed. 32 These organizations,
he asserts, aimed for the independence of Armenia and acted to gain European
involvement through the tactic of provocation-massacres-intervention. 33 Turkish
liberal historiography downplays the approach of Armenian historiography to
these revolutionary groups as pure self-defense units intended to protect the
Armenian-inhabitedareas from the Kurdish encroachments. For example, Selim
Deringil argues on this issue, stating that the well-armed Armenian partisan
groups that were active in Anatolia were more than "self-dcfense units."34 In
order to understand better the nature of these groups and their relations with the
Turkish and the Kurdish population, Deringil suggests concentrating more on
the interethnic periphery relationships. "What were the relations between the
sedentary Armenian population and the nomadic Kurds, say between 1880 and
1915?" asks Deringil. "How did the state policy articulate with local balances?
What were the dimensions of collaboration with Russia?"35 Deringil suggests
that in order to understand better the breaking points between the Armenians
and the Turks a considerable initial corpus of micro-level monographic studies
needs to be conducted. 36 Deringil raises an important point here and that is the
lack of micro-level monographic studies that deal with the Armeno-Turkish
conflict in particular on the periphery level as most of the studies tend to deal
more with the diplomatic and political history of the period. 37
As mentioned, the activities of the guerrillas in the Balkans and the events
that accompanied the Ottoman defeat by Russia in 1877-78, were hard blows
to the Ottomanist vision for a fraternal union of the people of the empire. 3x
Consequently, this led to the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Muslims who were escaping the Russian army or expelled by the Christian state
and looked for refuge in Asia Minor. Berktay argues that in this period the
Ottomans tried to repress nationalist uprisings in the Balkans and perpetrated
massacres. Then Turkish Muslims in the region were massacred and they fled
as a result to Istanbul and Anatolia. 39 Adamr and Berktay highlight the issue of
the immigration as an important factor in the deterioration of the Armeno-Turkish relationship. According to Berktay, this is an important point because the
bitterness of the uprisings in the Balkans caused great hatred (biiyiik hir hznr.·
biriktirdi) and desire for revenge among Turkish Muslims. He continues: "The
Armenian affair cannot be understood without paying attention to this hatred"
[Ermeni olaYl bu hznr; birikimi dikkate alznmadan anla§zlamaz].40
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Oppression
According to Deringil a "legitimacy crisis" took place in the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. This legitimacy crisis, which
had internal and external dimensions, resulted from the challenges of the time.
Deringil indicates that "by the reign of Abdulhamid. the desire of the state to
administer and control with hitherto unprecedented intensity led to a situation
where the role of the center had to be constantly re-defined."41 Onc of the challenges of the time was the rising Armenian nationalism that was reflectcd in
the Armenian revolutionary movements. Deringil indicates that as the tension
between Muslims and Armenians mounted in the 1890s, thc Ottoman ccnter
became more attentive to the smallest detail that could influence inter-community relations. 42 Furthermore, the center began monitoring every single
movement regardless if it was by a revolutionary group or a philanthropic one
that could endanger its entity and hence by taking the necessary measures it
tried to diminish that threat. For this, Deringil illustrates an interesting example
of Ottoman counter-espionage against the Hnchak revolutionaries in 1894.
The counter-espionage took place in the United States in order to monitor the
activities of the Hnehak party in Boston. The Ottoman government through
the Turkish consul in Boston tried to enlist an Armenian informant to gather
information about the activities of the local party organization. In the end, the
attempt failed as the Armenian informant began to demand higher compensation.43 The case indicates that the Ottoman government was active internationally
in monitoring the activities of the other branches of the revol utionary groups
that were present in the Ottoman Empire.
Meanwhile, Islam was used by the state as a mobilizing force of solidarity and
hence for demographic reasons the Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and
the Caucasus were resettled in Asia Minor, particularly in Armenian-populated
areas. The resettlement of refugees in these areas played an important role
in the escalating Armeno-Turkish tensions. Furthermore, in order to combat
the Russians, in 1891, Sultan Abdul Hamid II created the irregular I/umiciiye
regiments, primarily from among the Kurds, but as Adamr indicates, "in reality
these were against the local population, and contributed in deteriorating the
Armenian situation."44 Deringil, Berktay, and Engin Akarll argue the same.
According to Deringil: "There was certainly a policy during the Hamidian
era to use Kurdish tribes as Cossack-inspired irregulars [Hamidiye units]
against the Armenians, as there was a search for a new base of solidarity on
a recharged Islamic basis."45 Berktay, on the other hand, highlights the issue
of irregular troops in his comment on the massacres during the Ilamidian
period: "In any case, during the 'century of dissolution [t,·iiziihi.) yiizyill]' the
Ottoman administration repeatedly chose to use not the standing army [diizel1li
ordudan], but irregulars and undisciplined [diizel1siz gii~-leri] in these affairs,
relying on their primitiveness and violence."46 This point of irregular troops
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is an important one that Berktay raises again when discussing the Armenian
Genocide of 1915.
In addition, most of these scholars do not see a continuity between the
Hamidian massacres and the Young Turks policies as it is attested in some trends
of the Armenian historiography on the Armenian Genocide. 47 Deringil on this
point indicates that the "Hamidian policies of ad hoc, semiofficial and official
massacres were qualitatively different from the systematic persecution carried
out in the Young Turk era."4X Similarly, Akarh indicates the need to distinguish
between Abdul Hamid's relatively measured repression of the Armenians and
the annihilative policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks).
He continues on this point saying: "For all his faults, Abdulhamid felt more
bound by certain traditions of statecraft, which should help explain why the
Ottoman state lasted so long on such wide-flung territories."49
Causation and Contextualization
In discussing premeditation, implementation, and aftermath in the narrative
ofTurkish liberal historiography, it is necessary to consider the issue of causation
and contextualization in Armeno-Turkish relations. Generally speaking, causal
relations exist between events, that is, if event A occurs, then event B follows,
and "it can be reasonably demonstrated that event A explains the subsequent
(temporal sequential) occurrence of event B."so Some historians tend to place
an emphasis on causation. Noted British historian E. H. Carr, for example,
maintained that the study of history is the study of causes. SI Carr elaborates
further on this point: "The relation of the historian to his causes has the same
dual and reciprocal character as the relation of the historian to his facts. The
causes determine his interpretation ofthe historical process, and his interpretation determines his selection and marshalling of the causes. The hierarchy of
causes, the relative significance of one cause or set of causes or of another, is
the essence of his interpretation."s2 Thus, the hierarchy of causes is the essence
of interpretation.
Hayden White has a different perception. For him, focusing on the causes
of an event "fails to recognize the variety of narratives that can be told and that
themselves prefigure the type of causal connections to be made."s3 Because, as
Alan Munslow states, "White sees history as a literary artifact, he believes that
historians make causal links as part of their overall constitution and prefiguration of the historical field through the exercise of their historical imagination
and the employment of trope, emplotment, argument, ideological preference
and philosophical orientation."s4
As stated, Turkish liberal historiography tends to represent the historical
background ofthe Armeno-Turkish conflict by using causal relations. Thus, for
example, if there had been no Armenian economic advancement there would
not have been the growth of nationalism, and if there had been no resettlement
policy in the Armenian provinces there would not have been ethnic friction,
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and ifthere had been no revolt there would not have been oppression, and so
forth. The use of causal relations by Turkish liberal historiography in explaining
the historical events of 1915 limits the variety of other narratives explaining
those events.
The employment of causal relationships in Turkish liberal historiography
raises the concept of contextualization. Although, in such horrendous events
such as genocide, contextualization may help to explain the crime. it might also
demonstrate its inevitability and minimize the level of the catastrophe. Thus,
a scholar is faced with the dilemma of reconstructing the past through the integral use of causal relations and through contextualization and normalization
of the event to give it proper historical meaning but without losing the ethical
component. G6<;ek captures this dilemma with the following words:
If! contextualize the massacres of 1915 in my historiography, as I have. within a long
Turkish nationalist period that ends up normalizing 1915 and thereby. by implication.
mitigating and obliterating the trauma associated with 1915, then I need to critically
discuss the location of 1915 in and itself to address this possibility. For I am doubly
implicated, not only as a scholar but also as a Turk. It is therefore particularly imperative for me to acknowledge that I as a Turkish scholar convey the critical stand I take
in relation to 1915 in the historical narrative I construct.

What G6<;ek argues is that it is not contextualization and the ensuing normalization of the event that is problematic rather its uncritical manner. She continues
on this point: "What is at issue then is the ethics one employs in undertaking
the contextualization." 55 So how should scholars approach a subject such as
genocide? Based on Dominick LaCapra,56 G6<;ek suggests that the scholar
should engage in a strategic negotiation with the trauma and its historical actors:
"The conventional distance scholars place between themselves and their texts is
no longer there; the strategic negotiation enables the scholar to do a couple of
things simultaneously: he captures the complexity ofthe trauma, contextualize
it without normalizing it, and by reflecting on his own subject position during
this process, is able to clarify his ethical stand in relation to the trauma."

Premeditation-Implementation-Aftermath
Turkish liberal historiography examines the concepts of premeditation,
implementation, and aftermath through the lens of the second constitutional
period (l90S-1S).57In other words, the second constitutional period becomes the
ultimate tool for the contextualization of the historical event of 1915. Although
the contribution ofTurkish liberal historiography on the historical event of 1915 is
still in its infancy,58 the phase leading to the second constitutional period has been
examined thoroughly by shedding new light in particular on the Armeno-Turkish
relationship in the pre-revolution era and the level of their cooperation.
In a painstaking study,Siikrii Hanioglu has demonstrated the relationship
of the Young Turks with the Armenians, in particular with the Armenian
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Revolutionary Federation, which was more inclined to Prince Sabaheddin's
decentralization ideology.59 Furthermore, Hanioglu has demonstrated that the
relationship between the Young Turks and the Dashnaktsutiun was not great
because they disagreed on a number of points, especially the issues of foreign
intervention and decentralization. 6°Though in the first congress of the Ottoman
oppositional groups in 1902 the relationship of the Armenians with the Young
Turks was tense,6] between 1905 and 1907, the relationship between the Young
Turks and the Dashnaktsutiun improved, and as a result of Sabaheddin Bey's
efforts, the two sides reached a serious agreement for the first time in the history of the Young Turk movement. 62 Consequently, the Dashnaktsutiun began
to take part in the revolutionary propaganda that was not only confined to the
Armenian circles; rather it appealed also to the Turkish circles inviting them to
common action. 63 Furthermore, bogus organizations were formed in order to
maximize the spectrum of the revolution. The most important of these bogus
organizations established by the Dashnaktsutiun was the so-called Turkish
Allied Party. Hanioglu indicates that the real object of the Dashnaktsutiun, a
rapprochement between Turks and Armenians, became the most common theme
in the Turkish Allied Party's propaganda. 64
Regardless of the level of cooperation, the selective Anneno-Turkish cooperation against the regime of Abdul Hamid II is an important point that contradicts
the official Turkish history (resmi tarih) , which contends that the Armenian
revolutionary activities, in particular those of the Dashnaktsutiun against Abdul
Hamid, were rebellious acts aimed at the establishment of an independent Armenia and disregards Armenian cooperation with the Young Turks whose goals
were the overthrow of the oppressive sultan's regime and reinstatement of the
Ottoman constitution. 65 Despite this fact, two main issues remained as serious
obstacles in the Armeno-Turkish relationships: decentralization and international
intervention. It is no surprise that the Armenians like the Arabs and the Albanians
were more inclined to Prince Sabaheddin because of his decentralized approach
influenced by the theories of Demolins. 66 This is also evident in the Armenian
press in the post-revolution period by the entrance of Sabaheddin to Istanbul.
Hanioglu indicates that following his failure to interest the Armenian committees, some of which were bargaining with Sabaheddin at the same time, Behaeddin Shakir 67 decided to abandon his grandiose scheme of uniting all the Young
Turks, Ahmed lelaleddin Pasha, and the Annenian committees in an organization
that would in reality be under his control. 68 The result was that the organization
adopted the name the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress),69 Behaeddin
Shakir became responsible for the creation of four independent divisions of the
central committee, a fact that according to Hanioglu helped Behaeddin Shakir to
gain the upper hand in the organization and made him the hidden leader of the
new organization. 70 What is the significance of Behaeddin Shakir in the central
committee after the revolution? To what extent did Behaeddin Shakir manipulate
this role in the liquidation process of the Armenians in 1915?
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As mentioned, between 1905 and 1907, relations between the Young Turks
and the Dashnaktsutiun improved. This led the Armenian party to take a more
active role in a second congress of Ottoman oppositional parties in 1907. The
CUP, Prince Sabaheddin's League of Private Initiative and Decentralization, and
the Dashnaktsutiun,jointly organized that congress in which general agreement
was reached among the three committees. 7! According to Hanioglu. "the Year
1908 thus opened with a tactical alliance in place among three opposition committees. For those who had witnessed the endless debates between the leaders
of the Dashnaktsutiun and the CUP .. , this seemed a considerable success."c,
To what extent was this cooperation between the Dashnaktsutiun and the CUP
productive or vital for the realization of the Young Turk revolution'? To what
extent was this cooperation sincere? To what extent did the Young Turks trust the
Armenians? Hanioglu comments on this point, saying: "The CPU [CUP] papers
and available Ottoman documents reveal that the joint CPU-Dashnaktsutiun
revolutionary activities were very insignificant and that the CPU never trusted
the Dashnaktsutiun .... The CPU alliance with the Dashnaktsutiun played no role
whatsoever in that revolution and was for practical purposes almost worthless."-'
This indicates the level of the distrust that existed between the Committee or
Union and Progress and the Dashnaktsutiun, the only Armenian party cooperating with the CUP Why did the Young Turks not have sincere confidence in the
non-Muslim elements, in particular the Armenians'? According to Ak"am, the
Young Turks looked no more favorably on other non-Muslim elements living
in the Ottoman Empire. In the Young Turks' view the non- M usl ims represented
a potential threat that would or could split the empire."4
The Young Turk revolution of 1908 brought with it hopes of freedom and
equality. It was with the reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 that a
new phase began in the Ottoman Empire and which ended in the collapse of the
empire after World War 1. This phase was characterized by overlapping "isms,"
identities, and loyalties, ranging from Ottomanism to Islam ism. Turkisl11. and
Arabism. This phase was also characterized by immense international pressure
on the Ottoman Empire, loss of territories, and mounting pol iticization of the
ethnic boundaries.
The hopes for the ideal Ottoman society based on equality and justice after
the post-revolutionary period under the banner of Ottoman ism began to fade as
a result of political ruptures in this process. One ofthe most important ruptures
was the counterrevolution of 1909, which was initiated by the reactionary forces
in the Ottoman Empire. The counterrevolution, widely known as the 3 J Marl
olaylan (the March 31 incidents), and the accompanying massacres in Adana and
throughout Cilicia had a tremendous impact on disrupting the equilibrium of this
transitional period. Most Turkish liberal historians fai I to address this important
point. 75 Although the Cilician massacres were not the ultimate manirestation or
the radicalization of Turkish nationalism,7!> they opened a serious gap between
the Armenians and the Turks. For 1110st of the Turkish liberal historians it was the
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Balkan wars that led to the radicalization of Turkish nationalism and a drastic
change in the government's policy toward the Christian elements living in the
empire, in particular the Armenians. Adamr comments on this issue:
The Balkan wars (1912 and 1913) constituted a turning point in thc cvolution of the
relationship between the Young Turks and the Armenians. Two changes of political
direction seem to be significant in this regard: the first turning point is seen in the new
conception of the CUP about the national question. Confronted with a new wave of
Muslim refugees coming from the Balkan, the majority of the Young Turks abandoned
their egalitarian Ottomanist attitude and began to utilize the demands of the Muslims
in a campaign of defamation of the non-Muslim populations ....
The second turning point took place within the Armenian camp. After the disastrous Ottoman defeat in the Balkan wars and the fact that certain promises of the
Young Turks-such as those concerning the issue of the Armenian territories-did
not materialize, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation decided to place again the
solution of the Armenian Question in the hands of the Great Powers. 77

According to Adamr, this consequentially led to a grave crisis in the Young
Turk-Armenian relationship in 1913-14. 78
Rejecting the view that it was during the Balkan wars that Turkish nationalism began to be radicalized, Hanioglu, utilizing the private papers of several
secretaries of the CUP's secret central committee, maintains that the CUP was a
more intensely Turkish nationalist organization from an earlier date than many
historians have thought. 79 Commenting on this point, he writes: "It is obvious
that the Young Turks had strong nationalistic feelings even before the Young
Turk revolution of 1908. Contrary to commonly held views, this policy did not
begin after the Balkan wars of 1912-1913."80 So, if Turkish nationalism was
evident even before the 1908 revolution, does this mean that there was a longterm plan by Turkish nationalists to establish a Turanic empire in which the
Armenians were considered to be a huge impediment for the realization of this
ideology and does this mean that Pan-Turkism was the ultimate motive behind
the Armenian Genocide? Most Turkish liberal historians refute Pan-Turkism as
the ultimate ideology or the motive behind the annihilation of the Armenians. 81
Akarh comments on this point saying: "Since they are called 'Young Turks' by
common convention, and because some of them sometimes sang songs of a
mythical 'Turan' or Pan-Turkish state, we cannot jump at the conclusion that
they thus wanted to get rid of all the Armenians once and for all to clear the
way to the Turan. If the UPP [Union and Progress Party] leadership agreed on
anything, it was the preservation of Ottoman state as a centralized structure,
however much of it could be preserved, and at whatever COSt."82
The issue of Turkification or centralization still remains a lively debate
among Turkish liberal scholars. So what was the motive behind the Armenian
Genocide? AkGam argues that the feeling of vengeance, formed among Ottoman
Turkish officials as a result of continual territorial losses, was largely directed
at the non-Muslim minorities, "the "servants of yesterday," who lived on these
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lands. And during World War I this revenge, which could not have been taken
against the Bulgarians or the Greeks, was instead taken out against the "ungrateful" Armenians, who, by "collaborating with the imperialists, struck us from
behind."83 Ak<;am continues on this issue stating: "In short, the ruling members
of an Empire that was continually losing territories, that stood on the verge of
collapse, perceived the national and democratic demands of their Christian
subjects through the psychoses of isolation, fear and annihilation, and adopted
an approach to them that was in line with these feelings."x4
According to Berktay and Ak<;am, it is this feeling of "total annihilation" that
led the military dictatorship of the CUP to take such a drastic step especially
after the Armenian demands for reform. gS Ak<;am continues on this issue stating
that the ruling members of the empire approached these national demands with
the understanding that they would have to conduct a "war for survival." And
the only way to win this "war of survival" was through the homogenization of
troubled, heterogeneous areas. 86 I think that the concept of ' 'total annihilation" or
"war for survival" should be understood more as wartime rhetoric manipulatcd
by the CUP for the justification ofthe annihilation of the Armenians rather than
reflecting the "true" feelings of the CUP leadership. Regarding the premeditation
issue, Ak<;am demonstrates that the decision for the annihilation of the Armenians was taken in March 1915, when a clandestine decision was made against
the Armenians and Behaeddin Shakir was tasked with its implementation.x~
Ak<;am, Berktay, and Deringil believe that the decision t(lr the annihilation of
the Armenians was given orally to the regions. xx Berktay argucs that in the orders
for deportation there was no mention of massacre (kat!lam) and mass murder
(kmm). However, at the same time, separate unwritten special orders were givcn
(ayn ve yazlL almayan ozel emirler verilmi~·tir) to the most rapacious members
of the Special Organization (Te.ykilat-i Mahsusa) who "worshipcd violence and
were not bound to any moral codes" [hi(:bir toplumsal ahlak kaytdlyla bag/i
almayan]. 89 In the arguments of Ak<;am, Berktay, and Deringil, one notices a
special emphasis on the Special Organization and the total exclusion of the Ottoman army from the responsibility of the Genocide. [sn 't the army at the end
ofthe day the symbol of the state'? Wasn't this army the one who waged the War
of Independence that led to the establishment of the Turkish republic? Ak<;am
sees a strong relationship between the Armenian Genocide and the foundation
ofthe Turkish republic: "I think the main reason the Turks avoid any discussion
on history and make it a taboo lies in the reality of this connection between thc
Armenian Genocide and the foundation of the Turkish Rcpublic.''')''
Ayhan Aktar has demonstrated that this taboo was discussed in the Ottoman
Parliament long before the foundation of the Turkish republic.')] [n dealing with
the Ottoman parliamentary debates of 1918, Aktar emphasizes that no one from
the Ottoman deputies at that time has shed any doubt about the actuality of
the mass murder. By using the terminology imha edilmek (to be annihilated),
cinayeti azime (macabre murder), Ermeni kltalt (Armenian massacre), and
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Ermenifaciasz (Armenian catastrophe), the Ottoman Parliament confirmed that
"crimes against humanity" had been committed against the Armenians during
the world war. Aktar draws the following conclusions:

I. The deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, Muslim and non-Muslim, did not
enter a mode of saying: "this matter [massacres] did not take place and all the
sayings are false" (bu i~ almamz~'tzr, soylenenlerin hepsi yalandzr). However,
the proposals brought by Ottoman deputies of Armenian and Greek origins to
punish those responsible met with obstacles, as the deputies ofthe Committee
of Union and Progress were a majority in the Parliament. 92
2. The CUP deputies, on the one hand, were saying, that "Turks also died"
and the minority deputies, on the other hand, were saying that the bandit organizations (rete yonetimi) were responsible for the massacre and asked for their
punishment;
3. The current debates surrounding the Armenian deportation revolve around
two poles: on the one hand, there are those who adhere to the premeditated
character of an organized "genocide" and, on the other hand, there are those who
justify expulsions of hundreds of thousands of people as a simple administrative measure necessitated by the wartime conditions (~avas s,artlarznzn geregi
alan bas it bir idari tedbir).
Aktar summarizes: "And within this polarized context of 'blacks and whites,'
it becomes almost impossible to maintain an academic discussion. In this climate the voices of social scientists who are seeking truth in 'gray zones' [gri
alanlarda] are intimidated into silence and are asked to be condemned by the
law of 'national treachery' [hzyaneti vataniye]."93
The most recent incident of this sort is that of the conference organized by
Bosporus (Bogazi9i), Bilgi, and Sabancl universities and entitled "Ottoman
Armenians during the Era of Imperial Decline: Academic Responsibility and
Issues of Democracy" which had been scheduled to take place at Bosporus
University during May 25-27, 2005. The conference was deferred because of
the strong reactions of the government and both the ruling and the opposition
parties. Following Minister of Justice Cemil <;:igek's characterization of the
conference "as a treason against Turkey" [Tiirkiye 'ye hzyanet alarak] , Bosporus
University announced the postponement of the conference. 94 However, after
weeks of deliberations and numerous attempts by the Turkish government to
block the conference, it was held on September 24-25 at Bilgi University.95 The
conference is considered an important step for Turkish liberal historiography,
because for the first time since the founding of the Turkish republic in 1923,
a meeting within a Turkish university questioned the state narrative on one of
the most sensitive issues-the Armenian Genocide, whether or not it was given
that name.
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Conclusion
In historical narrative it is "narrativity" that, as Paul RicocLir puts it, "brings
us back from within-time-ness to historicality, from 'reckoning with' timc to
'recollecting' it."96 This chapter has attempted to assess the "recollecting" of
Turkish liberal historiography of an important event in the history of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. In doing so, it has shown that the narrative
of Turkish liberal historiography is not as monolithic as the narrative of the
resmi tarih (official history). Despite having some commonalities with the
Armenian historiography, Turkish liberal historiography still provides different
perspectives to understanding the Armenian Genocide. Moreover, Turkish liberal
historiography in its historical explanation ofthe event tends to deal more with
causal relations by using contextualization as a tool. In studying horrendous
events such as genocides, contextualization may yield a better understanding
of the event, but it might also tend to demonstrate its inevitabi Iity and thereby
minimize the level ofthe catastrophe. In addition, mostTurkish liberal historians
refrain from dealing directly with the mechanism of the event itsel( as they
tend to describe the macro-history ofthe event rather than dealing with it on the
micro-level. Turkish liberal historiography on the Armenian (ienocide is still in
its infancy, because a Turkish critical approach to the history of Turkey and the
Ottoman Empire in general is still on the threshold of achieving what Gli<,:ek
calls "post-nationalist critical narrative." One also need not forget that the task
of Turkish liberal historians, in particular those who "venture into the minefield"
or roam in the "gray zones," is an intricate one. Through workshops, dialogues,
and conferences Turkish liberal historiography can be fostered. Moreover, such
events must focus first and foremost on Turkish society through publishing
their proceedings in Turkish translation in order to promote the "narratives of
society" that challenge the "state narrative.",!7
Turkey today is standing on the threshold of entering the European Union.
Some will argue that this move will yield positive outcomes for Turkish liberal
historiography. However, the ongoing massive campaign by the Turkish government, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkll1ma Partisi or
AKP), and the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHPj,
both against the Armenian "claims" and the Turkish "collaborators," conveys
another message.
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